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Abstract 
This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the market 
probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large European banks with listed credit 
default swap (CDS) contracts during the period 2005-2015, which allow us to consider the impact of 
the recent financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined 
in Basel III have an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS 
spread is ambiguous. While capital appears to have a relatively large impact on CDS spread changes, 
liquidity risk is priced only when it falls below the regulatory threshold.  
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1. Introduction 
In normal times, asset markets are buoyant and funding is readily available.  The rapid changes 
in market conditions in the second half of the 2000s and the financial crisis that ensued have shown 
that liquidity can dry up very quickly and that it can take a long time to come back. Many large banks 
in the US and Europe experienced financial difficulties despite meeting the existing regulatory capital 
requirements because they did not prudently manage their liquidity. With greater liquidity and maturity 
transformation risk, central banks have had to take action both in money markets and individual 
institutions. Eventually, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed two standards 
for liquidity risk and a revision of capital requirements emphasising the importance of solvency 
requirements in conjunction with liquidity creation.1  
The new framework introduced with Basel III implied a shift from a unipolar approach, centred 
on risk-based measures of capital adequacy, towards a multi-polar one (Haldane, 2015), with multiple 
regulatory constraints at play, i.e. capital ratios and liquidity ratios. However, if a bank strengthens its 
capital ratios through the issuance of new equity and the withdrawal of short-term wholesale funding, 
its liquidity position also improves, since it reduces maturity transformation risk through the increase 
in the amount of stable funding. Equally, if a bank increases the liquidity of its assets by replacing 
loans with liquid securities, although its capital ratio remains unchanged, its risk-weighted capital 
improves since liquid assets have a lower risk weight than illiquid loans. This suggests that if a 
regulatory approach that accounts for multiple frictions and externalities is no doubt desirable, it may 
be an issue if it ignores risks that are interconnected. This paper enters this debate with the purpose of 
exploring the existence of such bidirectional relationship between capital and liquidity risk for a 
representative sample of large European banking institutions. 
The traditional role of banks is to perform maturity transformation. This contributes to efficient 
resource allocation and credit creation. However, while banks holding riskier assets should strengthen 
their capital to face unexpected losses from selling some assets at fire-sale prices, banks relying on a 
higher proportion of unstable funding sources for their activities, may need to hold more liquid assets 
to deal with liquidity risk. The problem is that banks have weak private incentives to limit excessive 
reliance on unstable funding of core (often illiquid) assets. Banks may also have private incentives to 
increase leverage, and to expand their balance sheets relying on relatively cheap and abundant short-
term wholesale funding. Rapid balance sheet growth can weaken the ability of individual banks to 
respond to liquidity and solvency shocks and, when they fail to internalise the costs associated with 
                                                 
1 For detailed information on the new regulatory requirements, see BCBS (2010a; 2010b; 2014 and 2017). 
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large funding gaps, this can have systemic implications. A highly interconnected financial system 
tends to exacerbate these spillovers.  
The 2008 global financial crisis has demonstrated the distress that can result from banks having 
insufficient financial resources in terms of capital or liquidity. It has also highlighted the need to 
develop models and market indicators that can help identify the weaknesses of large credit institutions 
in terms of capital and liquidity that can trigger systemic risk. Capital and liquidity may provide 
incremental information about the banks’ credit risk (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2017; Vazquez and 
Federico, 2015) and using credit default swap (CDS) spreads seem ideal because they give a direct 
measure of banks’ default risk.  In particular, bank CDS spreads can be considered a timely indicator 
of credit risk arising from low quality and inadequate capital and insufficient liquidity buffers. 
Therefore, the second research question this paper aims to investigate is on the effectiveness of CDS 
spreads in reflecting information of bank overall credit risk arising from low quality and inadequate 
capital, as well as insufficient liquidity buffers. More specifically, given the relationship between 
capital and liquidity analysed in the first part of this study, we explore if and to what extent these two 
factors separately and jointly contribute to CDS price changes during the crisis period. We expect the 
interrelation between capital and liquidity to be significantly associated with CDS spreads as higher 
capital levels reduce a bank’s liquidity needs. This in turn increases liquidity creation, as banks invest 
more in illiquid assets. With this analysis, we aim to contribute to the literature on the usefulness of 
accounting variables for pricing credit risk, with the caveat that previous studies (e.g. Annaert et al. 
2013) use only market factors and typically explain a limited proportion of CDS spread changes. In 
this study we also provide new insights on how effective CDS contracts are as market indicators of 
bank weaknesses that could be useful to regulators for prompting pre-emptive corrective actions. 
This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first to provide not only an empirical investigation of the contemporaneous 
interaction between capital and liquidity for a sample of European banks but also to extend the analysis 
to the impact of these variables on CDS spread changes. This approach differs from other studies as 
they typically focus on either the interrelations between capital and liquidity (e.g., Distinguin, Roulet, 
and Tarazi, 2013) or the determinants of CDS spread changes (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013; Hasan, 
Liuling, and Zhang, 2015). Examining both aspects allows us to shed light on the importance of the 
nexus between capital and liquidity, and on the extent to which they are priced risk factors on the CDS 
market. Relative to other approaches, the focus on CDS spreads allows us to infer on the impact on 
financial stability as their widening are normally associated to increased default risk. It is expected 
that a finding of a significant interrelation between capital and liquidity will provide support to the 
current set of reforms that introduced a minimum liquidity requirement concomitant to the capital 
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adequacy rules. It could also suggest the need to adopt interacting regulatory instruments if our analysis 
proved the existence of a bidirectional relationship between capital and liquidity risk. 
Second, we employ a sample of large banks operating in Europe over 2005-2015 thereby 
allowing us to consider the impact of both the global financial crisis and the euro sovereign debt crisis. 
We focus on large banks because they account for roughly 90% of aggregate bank liquidity, they 
typically have an easier access to the lender-of-last resort function and would be first to benefit from 
safety nets, as noted in Distinguin et al. (2013). As far as we are aware, no other published studies 
conducted an empirical investigation on the relationship between capital and liquidity in the context 
of the crisis using CDS spreads as one of the explanatory variables. For example, Distinguin et al. 
(2013) analyse the period before the financial crisis (2000-2006); Hovarth et al. (2012) use a sample 
of Czech banks from 2000 to 2010. In addition, while existing studies employ yearly on-balance sheet 
data, in our paper we rely on quarterly data and we also consider large banks’ off-balance sheet 
exposures which have previously been found as important determinants of liquidity risk management 
especially in large banks (Ippolito, Peydrò, Polo, and Sette, 2016). 
Third, we extend the literature in several directions. This paper explores the relationship 
between capital and liquidity in a way consistent with the most recent international regulatory 
framework for banks (Basel III). In particular, we employ two different configurations of the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) as liquidity measure; and three alternative definitions of capital: the 
leverage ratio, as expressed in the Basel III Accord, the risk-weighted capital ratios defined in Basel 
II and a market-based measure of capital. Employing alternative definitions of capital and liquidity is 
important not only for robustness but also because we expect some measures to produce different 
results. For example, we envisage that our analysis may cast doubts on the ability of risk-based capital 
ratios to capture the simultaneous interrelations between capital and liquidity. 
After examining the complex interrelations between capital and liquidity, we add to the 
literature by providing an empirical test to identify whether and to what extent market participants in 
the derivative (CDS) markets incorporate information on capital and liquidity into CDS spreads. It is 
expected that if investors exercised market discipline in the banking sector through the assessment of 
bank risk profiles into CDS spreads, supervisors should detect the weaknesses that can arise from 
banks having insufficient resources in terms of capital and liquidity indirectly, through the monitoring 
of derivatives. We focus on the CDS market because participation is dominated by institutional 
investors that tend to be better informed and equipped to monitor the risk profile of a bank compared 
to other investors. Volz and Wedow (2011) note that investors exercise market discipline in the CDS 
market, as they find that prices are positively correlated with banks’ risks. We expect capital and 
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liquidity to correlate negatively with banks’ CDS spreads as banks that are more capitalised and more 
liquid will have lower credit risk.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the usefulness of CDS spreads in capturing bank risk 
positions. In particular, we add to the previous works by Hasan et al. (2015) and Kanagaretnam, Zhang, 
and Zhang (2016) on the applicability of market-based variables and accounting-based bank 
fundamentals to explain CDS spread changes. The accounting information used in those studies is 
mostly based on CAMEL2 indicators in which only asset liquidity is considered. In our paper, we fill 
this gap by using a relatively large set of accounting variables and proxies for funding liquidity risk. 
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge studies focusing on CDS spread determinants do not include 
the effects of the sovereign debt crisis.  
Our evidence suggests a bidirectional positive relationship between capital and liquidity, 
thereby supporting the “financial fragility/crowding out of deposits” hypothesis developed in theory 
(see Section 2.1). Our results also confirm the ability of CDS spreads as a timely indicator of bank risk 
that can be used by regulators in early warning systems to monitor bank weaknesses. More specifically, 
we find that capital is an important determinant of CDS spread changes. However, funding liquidity 
risk is a determinant of CDS spread changes when it is above the minimum regulatory threshold and 
through the interaction with capital ratios. This suggests that investors evaluate the liquidity profile of 
a bank and incorporate their assessment in CDS prices. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature on 
the relationship between liquidity risk and capital and on the determinants of CDS spread changes in 
the banking sector. Section 3 describes the dataset and the variables included in the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 discusses the results. In Section 6 we perform a battery 
of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
This paper reconciles two strands of literature: the theories linking bank liquidity to capital 
(Section 2.1) and studies analysing the CDS spreads determinants of the banking sector (Section 2.2). 
 
 
                                                 
2 The Camel rating system is a supervisory rating system developed in the US. The acronym CAMEL stands for: Capital 
adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management quality (M), Earnings potential (E), Liquidity (L). 
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2.1 The relationship between liquidity and capital in banks 
Several theoretical papers have examined the relationship between bank capital and liquidity 
creation.3 The theoretical discussion has led to two main contrasting hypotheses: the “financial 
fragility/crowding out of deposits” hypothesis and the “risk absorption” hypothesis. The former 
combines two effects on liquidity creation derived from higher capital. On one hand, the financial 
fragility theory of Diamond and Rajan (2000; 2001), models a relationship bank that channels funds 
from investors to an entrepreneur. In this model deposits are fragile and prone to runs; so in the 
presence of uncertainty, bank capital has the crucial role of reducing the probability of insolvency. 
However, this affects the banks’ liquidity creation because with a less fragile capital structure 
monitoring will be reduced. Therefore, the theory predicts that banks set the optimum level of capital 
that trades off the benefits of liquidity creation with the costs of distress. On the other hand, capital 
may also reduce liquidity creation because it “crowds out” deposits. Gorton and Winton (2010; 2017) 
argue that compared to investments in equity capital, deposits are better at protecting from liquidity 
problems. Therefore, if investors’ funds shift from liquid deposits to illiquid equity capital, capital 
ratios increase but there is a reduction in liquidity. The alternative risk absorption hypothesis is directly 
linked to the risk transformation role of banks and predicts that liquidity creation entails a risk. The 
more liquidity is created the higher are the potential losses associated with the transformation of short-
term deposits into long-term illiquid assets. Since the role of capital is to absorb risk and expand banks’ 
risk-bearing capacity, higher capital ratios enhance the ability of banks to create liquidity 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2004; among others). 
Recent literature also suggests a causal relationship that moves from liquidity creation to 
capital. Again, the literature proposes two conflicting hypotheses: the “liquidity risk” and the “liquidity 
substitution” hypotheses. According to the former, greater liquidity creation increases the risk of 
illiquidity for banks. Thus banks should strengthen their solvency because capital acts as a buffer 
against unexpected withdrawals from customers (Horvàth, Seidler, and Weill, 2014). In contrast, the 
“liquidity substitution” hypothesis (Distinguin et al., 2013) postulates that when banks face higher 
illiquidity they may consider certain liabilities as stable sources, thus substituting capital with those 
stable liabilities.  
Berger and Bouwman (2009) empirically test the relationship between capital and a measure 
of liquidity creation for a sample of US banks over 1993-2003 with the expectation that the net effect 
                                                 
3 The concept of bank liquidity refers to the ability of a bank to pay its obligations when they fall due; or, alternatively, the 
ability of institutions to make agreed upon payments in a timely fashion. In contrast, liquidity creation, entails the 
transformation of short-term funds in long-term (mostly illiquid) assets, thus raising liquidity risk.  
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of bank capital on liquidity creation will likely differ depending on the banks’ relative size. The authors 
find that the relationship is positive for large banks when the liquidity creation measure includes off-
balance sheet items and insignificant when it is measured from on-balance sheet positions. For small 
banks, the relationship is negative and significant using both liquidity creation measures. More 
recently, Distinguin et al. (2013) employ a sample of US and European publicly traded banks over 
2000-2006 and analyse the impact of bank liquidity, measured using on balance sheet items, on 
regulatory capital ratios. The results suggest that banks decrease their regulatory capital when they 
create more liquidity or when they face higher illiquidity as defined in Basel III. Thus, capital is 
negatively related to bank liquidity creation. However, the “financial fragility” hypothesis should 
depend on the deposit insurance coverage. If insurance were complete, depositors would not need to 
run on the bank in situations of uncertainty. Fungacova, Weill, and Zhou (2017) empirically examine 
whether the introduction of deposit insurance affects the relationship between capital and liquidity for 
an emerging market (Russia). They find that the presence of deposit insurance has only a limited 
impact on the negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation and this is mainly for banks 
characterised by relatively high household deposit ratios. 
From an empirical point of view, the causal relationship between capital and liquidity is 
difficult to grasp because it may be jointly determined. Hovarth et al. (2012) analyse the possible bi-
causal relationship by employing a Granger causality test in a dynamic GMM panel estimator on a 
sample of Czech banks from 2000 to 2010. They show a negative relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation which confirms the financial fragility hypothesis. However, the authors also observe 
that liquidity creation Granger-causes a reduction in capital. This bi-directional negative causality 
suggests a trade-off between financial stability induced by stronger capital requirements and the 
economic benefits associated with liquidity creation.  
Taking a different perspective, Vazquez et al. (2015) and Chiaramonte et al. (2017) investigate 
the evolution of bank liquidity and leverage and their implications for financial stability. Vazquez et 
al. (2015) show the complementary nature of liquidity and capital in explaining bank fragility. The 
authors also find evidence of differences across bank size. More precisely, the smaller the bank the 
more vulnerable to liquidity risk while large banks are more likely to fail due to insufficient capital 
buffers. On the other hand, Chiaramonte et al. (2017), by analysing a sample of banks headquartered 
in Europe, argue that capital and liquidity play a complementary role only for large banks, while for 
all banks the only significant determinant of bank failure is the Basel III structural liquidity ratio, which 
measures the mismatch in the bank balance sheet. The impact of regulatory intervention during crisis 
periods may also change the liquidity creation and risk-taking behaviour of banks. In a recent study on 
Germany, Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2016) analyse the impact of regulatory interventions 
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on bank liquidity creation. Using a dataset on 278 banks over 1999-2009, the authors find that 
regulatory interventions and capital support reduce both liquidity creation and bank risk-taking.   
Based on the literature surveyed above, the issue of the relationship between capital and 
liquidity is far from unambiguous and is frequently found to be size-dependent. From a theoretical 
viewpoint, the “financial fragility/crowding out of deposits” hypothesis seems to apply more to small 
banks. Larger capital markets are often quite segmented implying that a shift in bank deposits have a 
relatively small impact on investors’ demand for equity and deposits. Therefore, the relationship 
between capital and liquidity creation should be positive for large banks as empirically found in Berger 
et al. (2009). However, this result was found to be significant only for the definition of liquidity 
creation that accounted for off-balance sheet business. Other authors, namely Distinguin et al. (2013) 
and Hovarth et al. (2012) have recently argued that the relationship can be negative also for large 
banks. Possible reasons may derive from their too-big-to-fail positions and their priority access to 
safety nets that generate an underestimation of liquidity risk. Moreover, the decline in bank capital 
ratios arising from loan losses constrained banks to hold more liquid assets, hence reducing maturity 
transformation risk. It follows that a first hypothesis can be formulated as follows:  
 
H1: The relationship between capital and liquidity creation is negative for large European 
banks 
 
Our prediction is that the negative relationship between bank capital and liquidity will hold 
during the crisis years for all banks in our sample. We conjecture that the financial and the euro 
sovereign debt crises and the regulatory reforms that followed, induced European banks to consider 
liquidity and capital as complementary determinants. This implies that banks strengthened their capital 
when facing liquidity concerns. Vazquez et al. (2015) and Chiaramonte et al. (2017), for example, 
have recently demonstrated the complementary role of liquidity and capital in explaining bank 
fragility.   
 
 
2.2 The influence of liquidity risk and capital on CDS spread changes 
High bank leverage and structural mismatches in bank balance sheets are crucial factors in the 
propagation of the financial crisis. A follow-up question is: how are CDS spread changes, which reflect 
the market probability of failure, explained by the relationship between liquidity and capital? To derive 
a testable hypothesis for this question we rely on the literature explaining CDS spread determinants. 
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The specifications of CDS spread models are based on the theory developed for the corporate bond 
credit spreads (Merton, 1974). However, structural variables have been found to have limited power 
in explaining credit spread changes. Recent studies (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; 
Blanco Brennan, and Marsh, 2005; Ericsson, Kris, and Oviedo, 2009) extend structural models by 
including some additional factors such as stock market returns and the slope of the yield curve, in 
response to the so-called credit spread puzzle.  
Works on CDS spread determinants (Galil, Shapir, Amiram, and Ben-Zion, 2014; Das, 
Hanouna, and Sarin, 2009; among others) generally exclude banks from the empirical investigations, 
due to their asset structure that exacerbates the credit spread puzzle. As a consequence, only a handful 
of studies shed light on the determinants of CDS spread changes in the banking sector. Annaert, De 
Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro, (2013) used structural variables to explain CDS spread changes for 32 
listed euro area banks. They find that the determinants of CDS spread changes vary across time, so the 
models should be re-estimated frequently. The authors also highlight the importance of market 
liquidity and market-wide factors in addition to structural variables in explaining CDS spread changes.  
Despite the popularity of market-based default metrics, the empirical literature on bank-failure 
(Cole and White, 2012; Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2016; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Altunbas, 
Manganelli, and Marques-Ibanez, 2017; among others) suggests that accounting information has an 
important role in predicting distress. If this is true, a hybrid model using both accounting ratios and 
market-based variables should better predict CDS spread changes. Hasan et al. (2015) investigate the 
effect of both structural variables and balance-sheet ratios on bank CDS spreads, while controlling for 
market factors. The authors find that balance-sheet ratios increase the explanatory power of structural 
variables. Furthermore, their results suggest that the impact of leverage and asset quality on CDS 
spreads is stronger during turmoil periods. Chiaramonte et al. (2013) find that CDS spreads reflect the 
credit risk captured by some balance sheet-ratios on a sample of European banks. In a related paper, 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2016) test the relevance of accounting information and loan/securities and 
investments by type in explaining CDS spread changes. The authors find that risky ABS securities and 
real estate were responsible for a major risk for US bank holding companies reflected in CDS spread 
changes. Liu et al. (2015) control for both structural variables and accounting indicators and find that 
deposit insurance has an adverse effect on bank CDS spreads. They also demonstrate that this tends to 
be greater when banks have poor asset quality and liquidity.  
The studies discussed above demonstrate that leverage plays a pivotal role over the stability of 
banks, but largely ignore liquidity risk and off-balance sheet exposure. Although studies focused on 
CDS spread changes include proxies for liquidity, they mostly focus on either CAMEL-based asset 
side liquidity or the general funding liquidity. Maturity transformation risk is typically ignored, just as 
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off-balance sheet exposures which are important determinants of banks’ liquidity and leverage 
respectively. Furthermore, the joint relationship between liquidity risk and leverage is also ignored. 
Therefore, by taking in consideration these components we are able to extend the literature on banks’ 
CDS spread determinants. Pairing these results with the findings of bank default studies, that show 
that capital and liquidity risk posed a serious threat to bank probability of failure (Chiaramonte et al., 
2017; Vazquez et al., 2015), leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The interplay between capital and liquidity contributes significantly to CDS spread 
changes 
 
 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data sources 
Our sample consists of European banks for which CDS contracts are listed. The selection of 
banking institutions is driven by the availability of data on CDS quotes on Bloomberg Professional 
Service.4 We obtain CDS spread series on 5-year senior debt contracts for 38 banks (a detailed list is 
provided in Table 1) at quarterly frequencies over the period 2005q1-2015q4. To ensure that CDS 
spread changes reflect meaningful information on bank credit risk, we retain only CDS spread changes 
during a given quarter if at least 80% of observations are non-zero during the quarter. Macroeconomic 
data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. Table 2 shows 
the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this study.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 Capital and liquidity risk proxy variables 
The target variables in our analysis are capital ratios and liquidity proxies as defined in Basel 
III. Capital requirements are usually set as a proportion of risk-weighted assets. The Basel II total 
regulatory capital ratio is defined as the sum of the core (Tier 1) and supplementary (Tier 2) capital on 
                                                 
4 Bloomberg relies on Credit market analysis (CMA) for pricing credit derivatives. CMA receives quotes for credit 
instruments from 30 buy-side firms, including major investment banks, hedge funds and asset managers.  
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risk-weighted assets. This latter includes hybrid instruments, therefore in order to gain a deeper insight 
we consider the total common equity tier 1 (CET 1), which is the ratio of total shareholder funds on 
risk-weighted assets. However, the risk-weighted calculation under Basel II rules might not reflect the 
actual risk. Capital measures based on non-risk-weighted assets may have been considered as more 
meaningful for stock participants (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche, 2013a) and better 
predictors of bank failure. In line with these studies and with the new Basel III regulations, we test the 
banks’ common leverage ratio as measured by the ratio of equity to total assets. Since large banks 
might increase their risk exposure through the management of their off-balance sheet activities, we 
also consider another measure of leverage defined as the ratio of equity to total assets and off-balance 
sheet exposures, in line with Basel III’s provisions. Regulatory capital formulations refer to measures 
of capital at book value, however banks could base their liquidity risk management practices also on 
market measures of capital.  For example, banks might target a market value of capital below which 
the bond market starts charging a risk premium; or they might target both book and market value of 
equity needed to pursue future acquisition strategies. Therefore, we also include the ratio of market 
capitalization to total market value.  
The banking literature has developed several synthetic liquidity indicators that attempt to gauge 
the true liquidity position of a bank (Deep and Schaefer, 2004; Berger et al., 2009; BIS, 2009). In the 
liquidity creation measure developed by Berger et al. (2009) assets and liabilities are classified as 
liquid, semiliquid or illiquid according to their maturity and weighted accordingly. The authors assume 
that liquid assets are easier to sell than illiquid assets and liquid liabilities can be more quickly 
withdrawn without penalty. Higher value of liquidity creation indicate higher bank illiquidity as bank 
invest liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. In that case, the bank is more exposed to maturity 
transformation risk if costumers claim the higher liquid portion of liabilities invested in illiquid assets 
saleable at fire sale prices. The liquidity creation measure is closely related to the regulatory measure 
of funding stability. The latter measure aims to promote bank resiliency by creating incentives for 
banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding. This liquidity measure is the ratio 
of the available stable funding (i.e. capital, liabilities with maturities of one year or greater, stable 
deposits) to the required amount of stable funding (i.e. the amount of assets with longer maturities). 
Higher values indicate lower illiquidity, as the bank is less involved in maturity transformation 
activities.  Based on their characteristics, we can argue that both indicators try to capture maturity 
transformation risk and both are measured giving a weight of the balance sheet items depending on 
their stability. 
In this study, we measure liquidity in a way consistent with Basel III’s provisions, and employ 
the NSFR, defined as the ratio of available stable funding to required stable funding. More precisely, 
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the NSFR is a ratio between the weighted sum of the different type of liabilities (Li) and assets (AJ) as 
shown in equation (1). 
 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =  
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝐴𝑗𝑗
   (1) 
 
The weights 𝑤𝑖 are defined by the Basel Committee and reflect the stability of the balance sheet 
components. It is to note that the lower is the NSFR, the higher is the bank liquidity risk but the higher 
is also the liquidity creation. Vice versa, the higher the NSFR, the lower the liquidity risk and the lower 
the liquidity creation, as banks produce less illiquid assets (i.e. loans).  
The details of all capital and liquidity proxy variables employed in this study are provided in 
Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
We test five measures of capital and two of liquidity. The proxies for capital include two risk 
unweighted capital ratios (with and without off-balance sheet exposures), two risk-weighted ones (total 
CET1 and total regulatory capital) and market capital, that is the ratio of equity market value to total 
market value of assets. Concerning liquidity, in 2014 the Committee issued a revision of the weights 
of the NSFR previously defined in the 2010 version. Due to the evolving nature of the Basel III, we 
calculate the two versions of the NSFR: NSFR_14 based on the latest technical document (BCBS, 
2014); and NSFR_10, based on the original document (BCBS, 2010b).5 We expect that using 
alternative definitions of capital and liquidity not only will add robustness to our results but also in 
some cases produce different results. Notably, we predict risk-based capital ratios to be less able to 
capture the simultaneous interrelations between capital and liquidity; we also expect market leverage 
to behave differently as market variations of equity are directly reflected on the marked-to-market 
leverage. 
 
 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that these measures are approximations because the granularity of bank assets and liabilities needed to 
calculate the NSFR is not available in Bloomberg professional service. As a result, we cannot split the loan portfolios 
according to their maturity and types, which under Basel III entails different weights. Following a conservative approach, 
we fix that the portfolio of loans requires an overall weight of 0.85. Furthermore, we cannot split securities in government 
bonds and other securities. Thus, following a conservative approach, we use a weight of 0.5, which is within the weight 
brackets proposed in Basel III for other securities items. This is in line with e.g. Distinguin et al. (2013) and Chiaramonte 
and Casu (2017). 
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4 Empirical methodology  
4.1 Modelling the relationship between liquidity risk and capital  
We first analyse the relationship between liquidity and capital using the set of proxy variables 
defined in Section 3.2. This analysis investigates the contribution of liquidity in explaining bank capital 
ratios. Berger et al. (2009) and Distinguin et al. (2013) claim that bank capital might also be a 
determinant of bank liquidity creation. For example, requiring a bank to hold more high-quality liquid 
assets makes it safer and less dependent on capital. To deal with simultaneity that is associated with 
endogeneity bias, we use a simultaneous equations model as in Distinguin et al. (2013).  
In the first equation in the system specified in (2), we regress capital ratios on a set of bank-
specific and macroeconomic factors, to which we add liquidity measures. In the second equation, we 
regress liquidity measures on a set of independent variables that include: bank-specific factors, the 
macroeconomic environment and the European Central Bank (ECB) policies. We employ a 
simultaneous equations model, where the system of equations is estimated via GMM:  
 
{
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝐷𝐶𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗
′𝐷𝐶𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜕𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝐷𝐿𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
′𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
   (2) 
 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 and 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 correspond to the capital and liquidity proxies, respectively. 𝐷𝐶𝑘𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐷𝐿𝑚𝑖,𝑡 are the k
th and the mth exogenous determinants of capital and liquidity.  𝐷𝐶𝑗𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐷𝐿𝑛𝑖,𝑡 are 
the mth and the nth endogenous determinants of capital and liquidity. The equations of the system 
described in (2) are estimated simultaneously through a GMM approach.  
A challenge for the estimation of our simultaneous equations system relates to potential 
endogeneity problems. For example, banks with a higher capital ratio tend to have higher NSFR as 
equity enters in the NSFR calculation. However, causation could also run in the opposite direction, 
when banks choose a higher NSFR in times of crisis, which in turn affects the levels of capital held. 
Following recent empirical studies, including Distinguin et al. (2013) and Dietrich et al. (2014), we 
test the endogeneity of the independent variables for both equations using the Durbin score and the 
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Wu-Hausman test to identify the appropriate instrument matrix. Endogenous covariates have been 
instrumented by their one-quarter lagged values.6  
We estimate the simultaneous equation through the GMM estimation method using robust 
standard errors. Following the relevant literature, in the capital equation in (2), we control for 
profitability, asset risk, bank charter value, size and the macroeconomic environment. We include 
profitability (the standard return on equity) because raising additional capital is costly. According to 
the pecking order theory funding extra capital is the most expensive financing choice, hence it may be 
easier to increase capital through retained earnings and lower dividend payments (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2008). Increasing capital buffers is relatively easy when earnings are high, thus we expect a 
positive relation between profitability and capital ratios. Asset risk is also included in the capital 
equation. According to Jokipii and Milne (2008), Berger, De Young, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin 
(2008), and Flannery et al. (2008) banks with risky portfolios generally hold more capital. This is 
because bank capital can be viewed as a buffer for absorbing losses from risky assets. During the crisis, 
the provisions for bad loans were not sufficient to absorb all losses. Thus banks had to increase the 
level of their allowances as a consequence of the accumulation of credit risk, which came at the 
expense of bank profits and ultimately impacted bank capital. Therefore, we expect a negative sign for 
the coefficient of the loan loss provisions over total assets in the determination of bank capital due to 
the unexpected cost of risk. Banks with higher chartered values might raise capital more easily and 
cheaply than their peers, implying less need for capital buffers (Berger et al., 2008).  
In contrast, Gropp and Heider (2010) suggest that bank reputation and chartered value should 
be protected by larger capital buffers. We use the ratio of market to book value as an indicator of 
chartered value. We have no expectations regarding the sign of the coefficient of this variable in the 
capital regression. Bank size is included to capture size effects on bank capital ratios. According to 
Berger et al. (2008), large banks are inclined to hold relatively lower capital buffers since they tend to 
be more diversified and better able to manage their risky assets. On the contrary, large institutions are 
constrained to hold more capital due to their systemic relevance, hence the relationship could be 
negative. We use the logarithm of total assets as a proxy of bank size. We do not have a prediction for 
the sign of the coefficient of this variable in the capital regression. Capital buffers are also related to 
the economic cycle. Capital requirements are procyclical because they may intensify the fluctuations 
of the business cycle, but large banks typically maintain significant capital surpluses (capital in excess 
                                                 
6 In the capital equation the endogenous variables are: NSFR, ROE and the loan loss provision, while in the liquidity 
equation the endogenous variables is: capital. We instrumented endogenous covariates by their one quarter lags. Using 
lagged variables as instruments is a common approach in the banking literature. A similar methodology is also applied in 
Dietrich et al. (2014) and Distinguin et al. (2013) for investigating the relationship between liquidity and performance and 
liquidity and capital, respectively.  
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of the capital requirements). The behaviour of these buffers may be countercyclical if banks use 
expansionary macroeconomic periods to rebuild capital during upturns. On the contrary, during 
recessions defaults on bank loans increase and generate higher losses that might impair buffers of 
capital. Therefore, we include the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy of the 
business cycle and although we expect a negative sign for GDP growth, we do not exclude the 
possibility of a positive relationship depending on the definition of capital used.     
In the liquidity equation in (2), we include the following variables: size, structural funding risk, 
central bank net lending facilities and, as for the capital equation, the macro environment. As noted 
above (Section 2.1), size differences among banks are expected to affect the degree of liquidity creation 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Moreover, size could be an indicator of market power, which improves 
the ability of banks to create liquidity from their balance sheet exposures. We expect a negative sign 
for the coefficient of this variable (proxied by the natural log of total assets) in the determination of 
bank liquidity. Following Hackethal, Rauch, Steffen, and Tyrell (2010) and Distinguin et al. (2013) 
when central bank’s policy rates decline credit supply to financial institutions increases, which 
positively affect bank liquidity. To uncover this effect, we use the ECB net lending to credit institutions 
index.7 We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in the determination of bank 
liquidity.  
In line with Distinguin et al. (2013), we introduce a proxy variable for liquidity pressure in the 
interbank market. We consider the spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rates 
and we expect that higher values of this variable will positively affect bank liquidity. The 
macroeconomic control variable for bank liquidity is based on Dietrich et al. (2014). In particular, we 
include the growth of real GDP and we expect a negative sign, as during economic booms banks 
increase liquidity creation (Distinguin et al., 2013).   
Finally, we include the logarithm of CDS changes to control for potential changes in the 
management of liquidity risk and capital in times of market stress. Before the crisis, potential threats 
related to liquidity and capital were widely ignored and banks were incentivised to rely on short-term 
funding rather than more stable funding sources. After the crisis, lack of liquidity and capital forced 
them to shrink their balance sheets, which would have had a beneficial effect on capital and NSFR.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The index measures the net lending to credit institutions. For further descriptions see: “TLCIECB Index” on Bloomberg 
Professional Service. 
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4.2 Factor model CDS spreads  
To examine the importance of the relationship between liquidity risk and capital, we ask 
whether both risks affect credit spread changes. To do so, we run a panel data fixed-effect regression 
model. Each regression uses the logarithm of quarterly CDS spreads as a dependent variable. 
Independent variables include bank structural variables, CAMELS indicators and macroeconomic 
controls. The baseline model is as follows:  
 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
 
where 𝐶𝐷𝑆 is the natural logarithm of CDS spread for bank i at year t; Capital and Liquidity are the 
five definitions of capital and the two measures of the NSFR described in Table 3. Y represent a set of 
bank specific covariates. Z represents structural variables and country level controls.  𝜗𝑡 are time fixed 
effects. We perform several tests to choose the appropriate method to estimate equation (3). The 
Hausman test and the Breusch-Pagan LM test recommend the use of a random effects (RE) model. 
The modified Wald test indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity. As a consequence, we estimate 
equation (3) using the RE estimation method and the Huber-White sandwich estimator to obtain 
standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within panel correlation. 
Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2016), Hasan et al. (2015), Chiaramonte et al. (2013), we 
include in the model these variables: the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans as a measure of 
asset quality; the return on assets as a measure of performance; the interest income over total income 
to control for traditional banking activities; and (the natural log of) total assets as a proxy for size.  We 
also control for structural variables and market-wide factors. In particular, for asset volatility we use 
the 60 days’ historical standard deviation of banks’ daily equity returns in a particular quarter (see 
Ericsson et al., 2009; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; and Galil et al., 2014). To reduce the credit-spread 
puzzle we include two market-wide factors following, among others, Ericsson et al. (2009), Collin-
Drufesne et al. (2001), Annaert et al. (2013) and Campbell et al. (2003). These are: the difference 
between the 10-year redemption yields and the 1-year Euribor rate that allows us to control for the 
market expectation about future conditions in the financial markets; and the return of the Eurostoxx 
600 stock index as a proxy of general business climate improvements.  
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 The relationship between capital and liquidity 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the simultaneous equations system described in equation 
(2). Our findings in Table 4 indicate that there is a positive bidirectional relationship between the 
capital ratios defined in the Basel III regulatory framework and the equity to total assets ratio and the 
NSFR. The higher the NSFR (the higher the liquidity of a bank) the higher the plain capital ratios. This 
evidence supports the “financial fragility/crowding out of deposits” hypothesis according to which 
higher capital hampers liquidity creation. This can occur either because of less monitoring, as theorised 
in Diamond et al. (2000; 2001), or because investors’ funds are shifted from deposits to capital thus 
reducing overall liquidity (Gorton et al., 2010, 2017). However, as noted in Berger and Bowman 
(2009) the effect is likely to be less important for large banks as these have easy access to domestic 
and international financial markets.8  
 The bidirectional relationship appears stronger, in columns (1a)-(1b) where we take into 
account the off-balance sheet exposures in the leverage ratio. This implies that large banks manage 
liquidity risk with sophisticated strategies that involve off-balance sheet exposures. Therefore the 
simple ratio of equity to total assets is less useful in understanding the relationship between capital and 
liquidity when examining large institutions.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
In Table 5, we analyse the relationship between liquidity and capital with risk-based and 
market- based measures of capital. We find that the NSFR is positive and significant when the Basel 
II risk-based capital ratios are the dependent variables. These results are in line with e.g., Distinguin 
et al. (2013), who claim that instead of strengthening their solvency standards, banks reduce their 
regulatory ratios when they face higher funding liquidity risk. Another explanation is that banks that 
have too much liquidity risk are unable to raise additional capital because they are considered too risky 
by investors. 
                                                 
8 The role of capital in liquidity creation may also be weakened by the provision of a depositors’ protection scheme. Using 
a natural experiment for the Russian banking sector, Fungacova et al. (2017) find that for those banks characterised by 
relatively high household deposit ratios, the introduction of the deposit insurance in 2004 affects the relationship between 
capital and liquidity creation. Although not tested in this study due to data limitations, one should not ignore that the 
relationship between capital and liquidity creation may be weakened by the provision of a depositors’ protection scheme. 
We thank an anonymous referee for noting this point. 
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In columns (5a) and (5b) we consider the market-based capital measure. We focus on market 
leverage because we are interested in the immediate impact of equity reductions on the NSFR, as 
market leverage reflects investors’ responses to market developments. When capital is marked to 
market, the responses to equity price changes are directly reflected to the market-based capital measure 
and may be disproportionately large in certain periods. According to Adrian and Shin (2010; 2014) 
marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical – that is, market variations of equity are directly 
reflected on the marked-to-market leverage – this may entail an immediate impact on the NSFR as 
capital decreases instantaneously, thus we find a negative and significant coefficient of the NSFR in 
the capital equation. Although capital decreases instantaneously due to market forces, banks then 
readjust their balance sheets through capital injections and asset substitution strategies, and this is 
evidenced by the positive coefficients displayed in columns 1a to 4b. 
Most of the findings are consistent with our predictions and those obtained in previous studies. 
In the capital equation, credit risk variables are always negative and significant, suggesting that banks 
strengthen their capital ratios when they face higher credit risk. The logarithm of total assets has a 
negative sign when we adopt the unweighted and the market measures of capital, while the relationship 
is positive when we use risk-weighted definitions of capital. This mixed result could be related to 
banks’ business mix, which has an impact on the estimation of the risk-weighted assets (i.e. loans have 
a higher charge in terms of risk-weighted assets compared to market based activities). We also find a 
negative and significant relationship between regulatory capital ratios (column 3a to 4b) and the GDP 
growth variable, while the other definitions of capital are positively related with the GDP growth 
variable. ROE is usually positive and carries a negative and significant sign when total regulatory 
capital is the dependent variable. This can be explained by the fact that the denominator (RWA) 
increases if banks engage in riskier activities (such as corporate loans) which are typically more 
profitable than less risky ones (securities). 
The control variables in the liquidity equation are all statistically significant and with the 
expected signs. In contrast to the literature that covers the period before the global financial crisis 
(Berger et al., 2009; Distinguin et al., 2013), we find a positive association between size and liquidity, 
while GDP growth is no longer significant. As expected, the coefficients of the interbank spread 
variable is positive and significant, suggesting that shocks in the interbank market force banks to 
increase their liquidity holdings. Moreover, the ECB liquidity injections increases bank liquidity 
during stressed market periods.  
Finally, we find a positive and significant sign for the lagged CDS spread variable in both the 
capital and liquidity equations. The results support our hypothesis that during stressed market periods, 
banks try to increase liquidity and capital to overcome financial market turmoil. 
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5.2 The impact of liquidity and capital on CDS spread changes  
To examine the importance of liquidity risk and capital, we ask whether both risks affect credit 
spread changes. The meaningful relationship between those variables discussed in Section 4 indicates 
a joint management of liquidity and capital in banks. If this is true we should find that capital and 
liquidity risk contribute to CDS spread changes, as predicted by our second hypothesis H2.  
Table 6 reports the results from running equation (3) in ten different models, using the five 
capital definitions and both versions of the NSFR. More precisely, we run the regression with Basel 
III formulations of capital (models 1a to 2b), the Basel II risk-based measures of capital (models 3a-
4b), and the market-based measures of capital (5a-5b).  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In most of the cases, the estimated coefficients for capital when significant are negative. This 
suggests that capitalised banks are perceived as safer than their less capitalised counterparts. The 
liquidity proxy variables are positive and insignificant in all regression models, suggesting that funding 
liquidity risk is not a determinant of CDS spread changes for large European banks. However, the lack 
of significance of the variable could be explained in different ways. Banks with higher credit risk might 
reduce maturity mismatches in order to reduce the probability of default (Imbierowicz et al., 2014). In 
addition, during the crisis banks with ratios of NSFR close to the minimum regulatory target might 
have decreased lending to manage liquidity risk.9 To shed further light into the matter, in Section 6.2 
we include a dummy variable to analyse if values of NSFR below one is a priced risk factor. We also 
analyse if liquidity ratios below the minimum requirement affect CDS spread changes through their 
interaction with capital measures.   
Table 6 also shows a positive relationship between bank CDS spreads and asset quality and a 
negative one with performance. The signs of these two variables reveal that the probability of default 
tends to increase with poor-quality loan portfolio and/or lower returns on assets. These outcomes 
confirm the findings of Chiaramonte et al. (2013) and Hasan et al. (2015). The share of interest income 
over total income appears to increase CDS spreads. The sign of the coefficient is in line with 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013b) who highlighted that fee income is negatively related to CDS spreads. 
However, this finding is in contrast with the literature on bank failure: DeYoung et al. (2013) 
                                                 
9 We test the proposition in the robustness test section. 
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demonstrate that banks with a higher level of fee-income are more likely to fail. In terms of asset size, 
the sign is negative and significant at the 1% level suggesting that the largest banks are considered less 
risky by the markets. This could be driven by the fact that these institutions are systemically important, 
or even TBTF (Too Big To Fail), and therefore more likely to benefit from government safety net 
guarantees. 
The equity volatility variable has coefficients consistent with theory (Merton, 1974) and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. As for the market-wide variables, the Eurostoxx and the term 
spread variables are both statistically significant and have the expected signs. In particular, the 
performance of the Eurostoxx has a negative sign, indicating that a deterioration in general business 
climate increases the probability of default and recovery rates, thus increasing CDS spread. In contrast, 
the term spread has a positive and significant sign. This is related to the increase in peripheral European 
government 10-year yields during the sovereign crisis, which obviously affected sovereign and bank 
CDS spreads.   
  
5.2.1 Are threshold effects at play? 
While all banks in our sample meet the minimum required capital target, some do not meet the 
liquidity requirements, while others have a NSFR well above the minimum required. To gauge 
potential threshold effects, we add a dummy variable to equation (3) which takes value one in case of 
the NSFR is below the minimum required and zero otherwise. The results of the investigation are 
reported in Table 7.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
In all cases when significant, we find a positive sign for the NSFR. This could be explained by 
the fact that banks with higher credit risk reduce lending to keep liquidity risk low to maintain the total 
level of default risk limited.10 On the contrary, banks with low credit risk do not necessarily have to 
manage both risks jointly because the overall risk is limited (Imbierowicz et al., 2014). Although the 
NSFR provision became a minimum standard by January 1st, 2018, the positive and significant sign of 
the dummy variable in all regression results suggests that the credit derivatives’ market prices the risk 
of having higher liquidity mismatches. 
                                                 
10 The correlation matrix shows a positive correlation between the NSFR and the ratio of NPLs to total loans, confirming 
our interpretation of the sign of the coefficient. In the robustness section, we demonstrate the proposition with an ad hoc 
regression model.    
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5.2.2 Model with indirect effects of liquidity risk    
In this subsection, we assume that liquidity ratios below the minimum requirement affect CDS 
spread changes through their interaction with capital measures. Table 8 reports the results for models 
with indirect effects of liquidity risk. Specifications (1a) to (5b) include an interaction term between 
the capital ratio and the dummy variable (Cap*NSFR) that takes value 1 if the NSFR is below one and 
0 otherwise.  
In all cases, when significant the interaction terms are positive, thus indicating that financial 
markets consider banks that have a higher liquidity risk (NSFR<1) riskier independently of their level 
of capital. The coefficients of the control variables remain roughly similar in terms of magnitude and 
significance, confirming the findings of the previous regression models.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Overall these results show that the interaction between capital and liquidity affects the 
probability of failure when liquidity is below the minimum regulatory target. Moreover, they could 
suggest that banks that have too much liquidity risk are expected to have difficulties in raising 
potentially further capital because they are perceived as too risky by investors. This implies that risky 
funding structures can lead to higher probability of default irrespective of capital levels. Requirements 
of funding liquidity in conjunction with capital requirements could thus help prevent the increase in 
probability of defaults of large financial institutions that could trigger systemic risk to the entire 
financial sector. 
The significance and magnitude of the control variables generally confirm the findings of the 
previous regression models reported in Tables 4-5. 
 
 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1 Robustness: bank capital and liquidity  
To test the reliability of our results on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity, we 
perform a battery of robustness checks. First, since the loan loss provision could be a discretionary 
tool to smooth earnings over time (Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Anandarajan, 2011), we re-estimate 
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the simultaneous equations system using an alternative credit risk measure. Specifically, we rely on 
the ratio of loan loss reserve to non-performing loans as a proxy of resources set aside to cover expected 
credit losses. The idea is that, if an institution lacks sufficient loan loss reserves to cover loans charged-
off, the excess charge-offs will be covered with capital. The results of the main variables of interest, 
reported in Table 9, are consistent with those previously obtained with the loan loss provision to total 
assets. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
We also consider two alternative liquidity proxies: the “liquidity transformation gap” (LT gap) 
defined in Deep and Schaefer (2004) and the cat-fat liquidity creation measure proposed by Berger et 
al. (2009). The LT gap is the difference between liquid liabilities and liquid assets held by a bank 
divided by its total assets. Thus the higher the coefficient the higher the illiquidity of a bank. The “cat-
fat” liquidity creation indicator assigns weights to different assets and liabilities based on their liquidity 
as defined in Berger et al. (2009). Similarly, to the liquidity transformation gap the higher the 
coefficient the higher the illiquidity of a bank. Again, our checks (Table 10) are consistent with those 
previously obtained with the NSFR variables in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Finally, according to Dietrich et al. (2014) business models may also have an impact on the 
NSFR. Given the higher weights assigned to loans and deposits in the denominator and numerator of 
the NSFR respectively, financial institutions focused on the lending/deposit taking business might 
have a higher NSFR than banks with a higher proportion of investment banking activities. We control 
for business models by adding the ratio of interest income to total income in the liquidity regression. 
The results (Table 11) are consistent with those obtained previously. Moreover, the interest income to 
total income variable has a positive and significant sign in line with the findings of Dietrich et al. 
(2014).  
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
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6.2 Robustness: CDS spread changes  
Several possible explanations are consistent with the positive relationship between the NSFR 
and CDS price changes. During the crisis banks with higher credit risk might reduce lending to keep 
liquidity risk low to maintain the total level of default risk limited. Moreover, banks with higher illiquid 
assets on their balance sheet might have reduced lending to increase asset liquidity. To test these 
hypotheses, we estimate a panel data fixed effect model where we regress the NSFR on five key drivers 
of liquidity risk management: (1) the level of non-performing loans; (2) the loan growth variable; (3) 
deposits as a fraction of total funding; (4) the Basel III leverage ratio; and (5) bank asset size. We 
include this latter to proxy for additional sources of heterogeneity among banks.  
To gauge the effects of the crisis we interact the variables with the interbank pressure, defined 
as the spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rates. We also control for time fixed 
effect with quarterly time dummies. The selection of the variables used is based on Cornett, McNutt, 
Strahan, and Tehranian (2011). Table 12 reports the regression results. We find evidence to support 
our hypotheses. Banks with higher credit risk tend to increase liquid assets to maintain the overall risk 
limited. In contrast, banks with higher NSFR ratios and lower credit risk continue to lend during the 
crisis period.    
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
To further check the validity of our results, we conduct a series of diagnostic tests. First, a 
potential concern may be the presence of endogeneity in our specification. As suggested in Volz et al. 
(2011), potentially our control variables for leverage, liquidity and credit risk may be determined 
simultaneously with CDS spreads. To deal with this issue, we estimate equation (3) through a random 
effects instrumental variable approach (IV-RE) and instrumented leverage, NSFR and the NPL ratio 
using their own lagged values. Results of the estimation are reported in Table 13. Clearly the concern 
of endogeneity appears limited and does not impact our variables of interest: leverage and liquidity 
risk. With the IV-RE approach credit risk increases in significance and performance variable decreases 
in significance, the other control variables remain roughly the same. We check also the results of the 
model with threshold effects with a different configuration. Specifically, we apply the IV-RE approach 
and instrumented leverage, the dummy variables which takes the value one in case the NSFR is below 
one (NSFR_10 < 1 or NSFR_14 < 1) and the credit risk variable with their own lags. The results of 
the estimation reported in Table 14 remain roughly the same as those shown in Table 7 with the RE 
model. As a third robustness check, we estimate equation (3) with a random effect GLS estimator 
 
24 
 
under the assumption that the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive derived by Baltagi and Wu 
(1999). Results in Table 15 confirm the main results reported in Table 6.  
Finally, we perform collinearity checks and correlation analysis among explanatory variables 
and do not find multicollinearity problems for all the regression reported.11  
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
Capital and liquidity are two crucial factors for bank survival. This study investigates the 
interconnections between these factors and the impact on CDS spreads for a sample of European banks 
over 2005 to 2015. Using various configurations of capital and liquidity consistent with the new Basel 
III regulation, we find a bidirectional positive relationship between capital and funding liquidity risk. 
The results also point to the need to appropriately measure capital and liquidity proxies. More 
precisely, we highlight the importance of considering off-balance sheet exposures in understanding 
the connections between capital and liquidity.  
Overall, our evidence supports the financial fragility hypothesis developed in Diamond et al. 
(2000; 2001) and are consistent with the empirical findings of e.g. Distinguin et al. (2013) and Horvàth 
et al. (2014). Given the complex relationship between capital and liquidity and the importance of both 
factors for financial stability, we question whether these are priced risk factors in the CDS market. We 
find that capital is a significant determinant of CDS spread changes, while the NSFR becomes 
significant only when the ratio falls below the minimum regulatory threshold. We also document that 
the interactions of both variables significantly determine banks’ market probability of default. 
This study offers several interesting policy implications. Our findings support the current set 
of regulatory reforms that introduced new minimum liquidity requirements concomitant to stricter 
capital ratios, as both are closely related to each other. Capital and liquidity requirements can thus help 
prevent the occurrence of systemic effects of risky funding sources as the last crisis has vividly 
                                                 
11 For brevity, these results are not presented in the text, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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demonstrated. Furthermore, in this study we observe that if the new multi-polar approach to bank 
regulation is desirable, the evidence of a bidirectional relationship between capital and liquidity calls 
for the introduction of interacting regulatory instruments i.e. a regulatory approach that accounts for 
such interconnections. Our results also cast doubts on the accuracy of risk-based capital ratios in 
capturing the simultaneous interrelations between capital and liquidity. This may need to be reassessed 
in a few years’ time as banks will have adapted to the Basel III reforms recently introduced by the 
Basel Committee (BCBS, 2017) to restore the credibility of the risk-based capital framework. 
In addition, our work provides evidence of market discipline in CDS spreads, as demonstrated 
by the positive correlation between bank risk and banks’ market probability of default. The derivative 
market evaluates changes in leverage and funding liquidity risk and incorporates those factors 
promptly into banks’ CDS spreads. Therefore, monitoring such securities generates signals that may 
convey useful information to supervisors to detect potential balance sheet weaknesses of large banks 
that could prompt systemic risk to the entire financial system. We noticed also that excessive maturity 
transformation is priced on CDS spreads and has an increasing effect on market probability of default.  
Finally, although not tested due to data limitations, the role of capital in liquidity creation may be 
weakened by the provision of depositors’ protection schemes. This will become even more important 
in the near future as the completion of the Banking Union with the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS) will call for further research on the relationship between capital and liquidity and the 
subsequent impact on banks’ probability of default. In particular, the introduction of the EDIS will 
likely to change the relationship between capital and liquidity for banks based in countries with lower 
protection of deposits. For these banks the deposit insurance scheme will likely weaken the impact of 
capital on liquidity creation.  
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Table 1 
The banks covered in the study 
Bank Country Bank Country 
 
Erste Group Bank AG 
 
Austria 
 
DNB ASA 
 
Norway 
Raiffeisen Bank  Austria Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 
Dexia Belgium Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 
Danske Bank A/S Denmark Banco Popular Spain 
BNP Paribas SA France Banco Sabadell Spain 
Credit Agricole SA France Banco Santander SA Spain 
Natixis France Nordea Bank Sweden 
Societe General France Skandinaviska Enskilada Banken Sweden 
Commerzbank AG Germany Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany Swedbank AB Sweden 
IKB Bank Germany Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland 
Alpha Bank A.E. Greece UBS AG Switzerland 
Bank of Ireland Ireland Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen The Netherlands 
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy ING Bank NV The Netherlands 
Banca Monte Paschi di Siena Italy Barclays Bank PLC UK 
Intesa Sanpaolo SPA Italy HSBC Bank PLC UK 
Mediobanca SPA Italy Lloyds Bank PLC UK 
UBI Banca Italy Royal Bank of Scotland PLC/The UK 
Unicredit SPA Italy Standard Chartered Bank UK 
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Table 2 
List of variables used together with their definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Basel III leverage  The ratio of tangible equity to total assets and off-balance 
sheet exposures 
0.047 0.021 0.016 0.083 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
The ratio of tangible equity to total assets 0.056 0.041 0.020 0.093 
CET1 The ratio of common equity to risk-weighted assets 0.161 0.056 0.049 0.188 
Total Capital The ratio of Tier 1 and 2 to risk-weighted assets 0.140 0.036 0.096 0.208 
Market Capital The ratio of equity market value to total market value of 
assets 
0.077 0.109 0.002 0.404 
NSFR_10 The ratio of available stable funding to required stable fined 
as define by the Basel III document of December 2010 
1.048 0.218 0.368 2.158 
NSFR_14 The ratio of available stable funding to required stable fined 
as defined by the Basel III document of December 2014 
1.072 0.223 0.381 2.190 
ROE Net income to total equity capital 0.081 0.151 -0.08 0.223 
LLP/TA The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 0.236 0.306 0.001 0.016 
MKT_BV Total market value to book value 0.883 0.205 0.546 1.201 
Size Logarithm of total assets  5.712 0.563 4.497 6.564 
GDP Growth Percentage of GDP growth 0.004 0.023 -0.09    0.053 
Interbank Spread Spread between the one-month interbank rate  
and the policy rates 
0.016 0.0163 -0.01 0.008 
ECB Lending ECB net lending to credit institutions 2.649 0.121 2.206 2.825 
LLR_NPL Loan loss reserves to non-performing loans 0.736 0.951 0.339 1.919 
Income 
diversification 
Interest income over total income 0.530 3.590 0.227 0.989 
NPL/TL The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 0.059 0.076 0.004 0.176 
ROA Return on Assets 0.005 0.048 -0.008 0.128 
Loans/TA The ratio of loans to total assets 0.530 0.179 0.195 0.786 
Equity Volatility 60 days standard deviation of bank stock returns 40.55 31.25 15.26 92.77 
Euro Stoxx The natural logarithm of the Eurostoxx 600 index 2.467 0.081 2.24 2.599 
Term Spread The difference between the 10-year government bond yield 
for each country and the 1-year Euribor/Libor rate  
1.629 2.446 -0.64 6.076 
CDS spread The natural logarithm of CDS spread changes 1.933 0.555 0.528 3.360 
Source: Bloomberg (2005-2015). This table reports the definitions and the descriptive statistics of all variables used in 
the study. 
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Table 3 
Bank capital and liquidity risk proxy variables 
Category Proxy Calculation Definition 
    
Risk-
Unweighted 
Capital Ratio 
Basel III 
Leverage 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
 
The ratio of tangible equity 
to total assets and off-
balance sheet exposures 
    
Risk-
Unweighted 
Capital Ratio 
Equity to 
Total 
Assets  
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The ratio of tangible equity 
to total assets 
    
Regulatory 
Capital 
CET1  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑊𝐴
 
The ratio of common equity 
to risk-weighted assets 
    
Regulatory 
Capital 
Total 
capital 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2
𝑅𝑊𝐴
 
The ratio of Tier 1 and 2 to 
risk-weighted assets 
    
Market Capital Market 
Capital 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
The ratio of equity market 
value to total market value 
of assets 
    
Liquidity  NSFR_10a 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
+0.95 ∗ 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
+0.90 ∗ 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
+0.50 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔
0.5 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 0.85 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 +
1 ∗ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+0.05 ∗ 𝑂𝑓𝑓 −  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠
 
The ratio of available stable 
funding to required stable 
funding as defined by the 
Basel III document of 
December 2010 
    
Liquidity  NSFR_14a 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
+0.90 ∗  𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
+0.80 ∗ 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
+0.50 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔
0.50 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 0.85 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 +
1 ∗ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+0.05 ∗ 𝑂𝑓𝑓 − 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠
 
The ratio of available stable 
funding to required stable 
funding as defined by the 
new Basel III document of 
October 2014 
This table contains the description and the calculation methodology of our target variables: capital and funding liquidity. 
a Other assets are the sum of: the reserve for impaired loans, non-earning assets (total assets-total earnings assets- cash and 
due from banks), fixed assets, other earning assets, insurance assets, investments in property and equity investments in 
associates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 4 
The relationship between capital (Basel III regulatory framework and the equity to total assets ratios) and 
liquidity 
 Basel III leverage Basel III leverage Equity to total assets Equity to total assets 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 
Capital equation 
    
     
NSFR_14 0.016** 
(2.01) 
 0.014* 
(1.69) 
 
NSFR_10  0.016** 
(1.99) 
 0.015* 
(1.71) 
ROE 0.175*** 
(5.10) 
0.175*** 
(5.10) 
0.131*** 
(7.41) 
0.131*** 
(7.42) 
LLP to TA -0.0002* 
(-1.76) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.76) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.31) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.23) 
MKT_BV 0.007 
(0.86) 
0.007 
(0.90) 
0.028 
(0.68) 
-0.029 
(-0.43) 
Size -0.025*** 
(-7.15) 
-0.025*** 
(-7.13) 
-0.013*** 
(-12.82) 
-0.013*** 
(-12.76) 
GDP growth 0.150* 
(1.93) 
0.150* 
(1.93) 
0.043 
(0.85) 
0.044 
(087.) 
CDS spreads 0.082*** 
(8.14) 
0.082*** 
(8.14) 
0.052*** 
(14.43) 
0.0563** 
(14.65) 
     
Liquidity equation     
     
Capital 2.552*** 
(3.50) 
2.37*** 
(3.33) 
1.409*** 
(3.39) 
1.384*** 
(3.40) 
Size 0.094** 
(4.58) 
0.091*** 
(4.57) 
0.033*** 
(2.73) 
0.035*** 
(2.96) 
Interbank spread  15.977*** 
(3.32) 
15.732*** 
(3.32) 
13.19*** 
(3.55) 
12.699*** 
(3.48) 
ECB lending 0.078* 
(1.59) 
0.080* 
(1.68) 
0.198*** 
(5.01) 
0.189*** 
(4.84) 
GDP growth -0.429 
(-0.84) 
-0.447* 
(-0.90) 
0.468 
(1.36) 
0.441 
(1.29) 
CDS spreads 0.114*** 
(2.63) 
0.111*** 
(2.62) 
0.166*** 
(5.10) 
0.159*** 
(4.96) 
     
Hansen  3.119 2.717 2.767 2.820 
Hansen p-value 0.210 0.257 0.250 0.244 
Observations 611 611 843 843 
This table shows the results of estimating equation system (2). The capital ratios are defined in the Basel III regulatory 
framework and the equity to total assets ratios. The liquidity ratios are the NSFR defined in the Basel III document of 
December 2010 (NSFR 2010) and the NSFR defined in the Basel III document of October 2014 (NSFR 2014). See Table 
2 for the definition of the explanatory variables. Bank-level covariates enter the estimations with a one quarter lag. 
Endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged values. In the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the 
estimates the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics 
based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 5 
The relationship between capital (Basel II risk weighted capital ratios and the market capital ratio) and liquidity  
 CET 1 CET 1 Total capital Total capital Market capital Market capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
 
Capital Equation 
      
       
NSFR_14 0.047*** 
(3.17) 
 0.023** 
(2.33) 
 -0.032** 
(-2.07) 
 
NSFR_10  0.049*** 
(3.31) 
 0.024** 
(2.36) 
 -0.033** 
(2.07) 
ROE 0.03 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.042** 
(-2.44) 
-0.041** 
(-2.42) 
0.406*** 
(5.31) 
0.406*** 
(5.31) 
LLP to TA -0.0003*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.11) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.12) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.25) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.26) 
MKT_BV -0.036** 
(-3.30) 
-0.037** 
(3.45) 
0.006 
(0.73) 
0.005 
(0.77) 
0.037** 
(2.10) 
0.037** 
(2.11) 
Size 0.023*** 
(10.18) 
0.022*** 
(10.11) 
0.027*** 
(20.05) 
0.027*** 
(20.05) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.305*** 
(-3.67) 
GDP growth -0.245** 
(-2.15) 
-0.245*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.185** 
(-3.01) 
0.307* 
(1.99) 
0.305** 
(1.98) 
CDS Spreads -0.020** 
(-2.42) 
-0.020** 
(-2.41) 
-0.015** 
(-2.83) 
-0.014** 
(-2.80) 
-0.106*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.106*** 
(-4.43) 
       
Liquidity equation      
       
Capital 0.162 
(1.25) 
0.168 
(1.30) 
0.384 
(1.48) 
0.386 
(1.58) 
0.939* 
(1.94) 
0.921* 
(1.96) 
Size 0.016* 
(1.68) 
0.018* 
(1.78) 
0.015 
(0.97) 
0.018 
(1.11) 
0.058** 
(2.80) 
0.057*** 
(2.85) 
Interbank spread  18.86*** 
(4.93) 
18.17*** 
(4.84) 
20.48*** 
(5.29) 
19.84*** 
(5.23) 
15.147*** 
(3.10) 
14.672*** 
(3.07) 
ECB lending 0.254*** 
(5.34) 
0.246*** 
(5.23) 
0.227*** 
(4.94) 
0.218*** 
(4.85) 
0.121* 
(1.89) 
0.119* 
(1.90) 
GDP growth 0.341 
(0.90) 
0.312 
(0.83) 
0.262 
(0.70) 
0.228 
(0.60) 
0.740 
(1.26) 
0.725 
(1.26) 
CDS spreads 0.171*** 
(4.95) 
0.163*** 
(4.81) 
0.194*** 
(5.53) 
0.185*** 
(5.38) 
0.192*** 
(4.69) 
0.186*** 
(4.65) 
       
Hansen  1.17 1.09 1.277 1.190 0.854 0.696 
Hansen p-value 0.279 0.294 0.258 0.275 0.652 0.706 
Observations 808 808 900 900 568 568 
This table shows the results of estimating equation system (2). The capital ratios are those defined in the Basel II regulatory 
framework and the ratio of the market value of equity over the total market value.  The liquidity ratios are the NSFR defined 
in the Basel III document of December 2010 (NSFR 2010) and the NSFR defined in the Basel III document of October 
2014 (NSFR 2014). See Table 2 for the definition of the explanatory variables. Bank-level covariates enter the estimations 
with a one quarter lag. Endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged values. In the Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions for the estimates the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with residuals 
and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets.  
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Table 6 
Results of the baseline model of CDS spread changes 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
0.542 
(0.47) 
0.531 
(0.46) 
        
           
Equity to 
Total Assets 
  -0.688* 
(-1.75) 
-0.687* 
(-1.74) 
      
           
CET1     -0.125 
(-1.01) 
-0.125 
(-1.00) 
    
Total  
capital 
      -1.44*** 
(-3.72) 
-1.44** 
(-3.72) 
  
           
Market  
capital 
        -0.646** 
(-2.06) 
-0.645** 
(-2.06) 
Liquidity           
NSFR_10 0.028 
(0.50) 
 0.054 
(0.95) 
 0.044 
(0.71) 
 0.050 
(0.80) 
 0.047 
(0.75) 
 
NSFR_14  0.308 
(0.55) 
 0.055 
(0.99) 
 0.046 
(0.74) 
 0.050 
(0.83) 
 0.050 
(0.79) 
Asset quality          
NPL/TL 0.518* 
(1.58) 
0.519* 
(1.58) 
0.670** 
(2.30) 
0.670** 
(2.03) 
0.504* 
(1.56) 
0.506* 
(1.56) 
0.445 
(1.35) 
0.445 
(1.36) 
0.461 
(1.42) 
0.481 
(1.43) 
Performance          
ROA -0.282*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.282*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.267*** 
(-7.42) 
-0.267*** 
(-7.41) 
-0.374*** 
(-4.55) 
-0.374*** 
(-4.55) 
-0.295*** 
(-9.38) 
-0.295*** 
(-9.38) 
-0.319*** 
(-11.85) 
-0.32*** 
(-11.87) 
Business models          
Income  
Divers. 
0.003*** 
(5.10) 
0.003*** 
(5.11) 
0.003*** 
(4.70) 
0.003*** 
(4.70) 
0.003*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(4.69) 
0.003*** 
(4.70) 
0.003*** 
(4.77) 
0.003*** 
(4.77) 
Size -0.164*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.164*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.182*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.181*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.169** 
(-3.56) 
-0.176*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.154*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.154*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.178*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.18*** 
(3.48) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004*** 
(5.30) 
0.004*** 
(5.31) 
0.004*** 
(4.97) 
0.004** 
(4.97) 
0.004*** 
(5.82) 
0.004*** 
(5.83) 
0.004*** 
(5.30) 
0.004** 
(5.31) 
0.004*** 
(5.02) 
0.004*** 
(5.03) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.083*** 
(-4.08) 
-1.083*** 
(-4.08) 
-1.10*** 
(-4.09) 
-1.10*** 
(-4.09) 
-1.02*** 
(-3.88) 
-1.02*** 
(-3.88) 
-1.05*** 
(-3.84) 
-1.047*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.38) 
Term  
spread 
0.033*** 
(4.88) 
0.033*** 
(4.89) 
0.033*** 
(4.51) 
0.033*** 
(4.51) 
0.034*** 
(4.91) 
0.034*** 
(4.92) 
0.031*** 
(4.95) 
0.031*** 
(4.95) 
0.031*** 
(4.18) 
0.031*** 
(4.18) 
Constant 4.524*** 
(5.77) 
4.543*** 
(5.77) 
4.795*** 
(6.13) 
4.791**** 
(6.13) 
4.462*** 
(6.01) 
4.459*** 
(6.01) 
4.57*** 
(6.05) 
4.57*** 
(6.05) 
4.274*** 
(5.54) 
4.27*** 
(5.54) 
Observations 841 841 854 854 847 847 841 841 791 791 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.869 0.87 0.875 0.875 0.871 0.871 0.874 0.874 0.88 0.88 
Hausman  
(p-value) 
0.222 0.185 0.324 0.323 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 
BP LM Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mod. Wald  
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table shows the RE estimation results of equation (3). See Tables 2-3 for the definition of the explanatory variables. 
Hausman is a test to decide between fixed or random effects. The null is that the preferred model is random effects. BP 
LM Test is the Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects. Modified Wald is a test of homoscedasticity. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are provided in brackets. 
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Table 7 
Results of the baseline model with threshold effects 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
0.573 
(0.50) 
0.660 
(0.58) 
        
           
Equity to 
Total Assets 
  -0.723* 
(-1.75) 
-0.704* 
(-1.73) 
      
           
CET1     -0.125 
(-0.94) 
-0.120 
(-0.91) 
    
Total  
capital 
      -1.45*** 
(3.59) 
-1.44*** 
(3.61) 
  
           
Market  
capital 
        -0.645** 
(-2.05) 
-0.637** 
(-2.01) 
Liquidity          
NSFR_10 0.076 
(0.91) 
 0.124 
(1.37) 
 0.033 
(0.95) 
 0.095 
(1.05) 
 0.064 
(0.69) 
 
NSFR_14  0.111 
(1.39) 
 0.145* 
(1.76) 
 0.054* 
(1.63) 
 0.129* 
(1.62) 
 0.101 
(1.14) 
NSFR_10 <1 0.027 
(0.75) 
 0.028 
(0.74) 
 0.977* 
(1.67) 
 0.02 
(0.50) 
 0.008 
(0.19) 
 
NSFR_14 <1  0.050* 
(1.62) 
 0.047* 
(1.61) 
 0.137** 
(3.22) 
 0.127** 
(3.17) 
 0.032* 
(1.72) 
Asset quality          
NPL/TL 0.526* 
(1.54) 
0.521* 
(1.58) 
0.669** 
(1.97) 
0.662** 
(1.94) 
0.50* 
(1.54) 
0.496* 
(1.54) 
0.45 
(1.35) 
0.445 
(1.33) 
0.477 
(1.42) 
0.479 
(1.41) 
Performance          
Roa -0.27*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.27*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.26** 
(-7.11) 
-0.26*** 
(-7.13) 
-0.37*** 
(-4.40) 
-0.37*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.29*** 
(-9.97) 
-0.29*** 
(-10.21) 
-0.32*** 
(-11.87) 
-0.31*** 
(-11.92) 
Business models          
Income  
Divers. 
0.003*** 
(5.15) 
0.003*** 
(5.27) 
0.003*** 
(4.65) 
0.003*** 
(4.68) 
0.003*** 
(5.21) 
0.003*** 
(5.29) 
0.003*** 
(4.61) 
0.003*** 
(4.66) 
0.003*** 
(4.62) 
0.003*** 
(4.60) 
Size -0.164*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.164*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.195*** 
(-4.45) 
-0.193*** 
(4.35) 
-0.176*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.176*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.154*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.153*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.183*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.182*** 
(-3.53) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004*** 
(5.28) 
0.004*** 
(5.28) 
0.004*** 
(5.04) 
0.004** 
(5.04) 
0.004*** 
(5.86) 
0.004*** 
(5.85) 
0.004*** 
(5.26) 
0.004** 
(5.28) 
0.004*** 
(5.07) 
0.004*** 
(5.06) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.08*** 
(-4.10) 
-1.02*** 
(-4.16) 
-1.10*** 
(-4.17) 
-1.10*** 
(-4.21) 
-1.02*** 
(-3.89) 
-1.03*** 
(-3.94) 
-1.05*** 
(-3.87) 
-1.06*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.44) 
Term  
spread 
0.033*** 
(4.78) 
0.033*** 
(4.71) 
0.033*** 
(4.21) 
0.033*** 
(4.13) 
0.034*** 
(4.66) 
0.034*** 
(4.56) 
0.031*** 
(4.50) 
0.031*** 
(4.39) 
0.031*** 
(4.05) 
0.031*** 
(3.94) 
Constant 4.478*** 
(5.69) 
4.467*** 
(5.70) 
4.735*** 
(6.20) 
4.717*** 
(6.22) 
4.390*** 
(5.90) 
4.37*** 
(5.92) 
4.54*** 
(6.00) 
4.52*** 
(6.04) 
4.254*** 
(5.35) 
4.23*** 
(5.35) 
Observations 841 841 854 854 847 847 841 841 791 791 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.868 0.87 0.875 0.875 0.871 0.871 0.873 0.874 0.877 0.88 
Hausman  
(p-value) 
0.203 0.425 0.40 0.483 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.07 
BP LM Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mod. Wald  
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table shows the RE estimation results of equation (3) with threshold effects. See Tables 2-3 for the definition of the 
explanatory variables. NSFR 10 < 1 and NSFR 14 <1 are dummy variables which take value one when respectively the 
first and the last version of the NSFR takes a value below one. Hausman is a test to decide between fixed or random effects, 
the null is that the preferred model is random effects. BP LM Test is the Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random 
effects. Modified Wald is a test of homoscedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets.  
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Table 8 
Results of the Baseline model with indirect effects of liquidity risk on CDS spread changes 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
0.548 
(0.46) 
0.488 
(0.41) 
        
           
Equity to 
Total Assets 
  -0.332 
(-0.79) 
-0.424 
(-0.93) 
      
           
CET1     -0.158 
(-1.11) 
-0.171 
(-1.17) 
    
Total  
capital 
      -1.48*** 
(-3.91) 
-1.50*** 
(-3.98) 
  
           
Market  
capital 
        -0.687** 
(-2.19) 
-0.680** 
(-2.17) 
Liquidity          
NSFR_10 0.028 
(0.91) 
 -0.047 
(-0.65) 
 0.073 
(1.05) 
 0.114 
(1.47) 
 0.061 
(0.99) 
 
NSFR_14  0.069 
(1.04) 
 -0.019 
(-0.30) 
 0.083 
(1.26) 
 0.135* 
(1.84) 
 0.065 
(1.08) 
Cap*NSFR_10  0.011 
(0.20) 
 0.780** 
(2.03) 
 0.100 
(0.74) 
 0.24 
(1.11) 
 0.135** 
(2.52) 
 
Cap*NSFR_14  0.633 
(0.94) 
 0.063* 
(1.67) 
 0.140 
(0.99) 
 0.355* 
(1.65) 
 0.167*** 
(3.13) 
Asset quality          
NPL/TL 0.523* 
(1.56) 
0.526* 
(1.55) 
0.823*** 
(3.16) 
0.803*** 
(3.00) 
0.488* 
(1.54) 
0.488* 
(1.54) 
0.45 
(1.34) 
0.453 
(1.33) 
0.477 
(1.43) 
0.480 
(1.44) 
Performance          
Roa -0.27*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.28*** 
(-3.54) 
-0.27** 
(-7.46) 
-0.27*** 
(-7.27) 
-0.35*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.34*** 
(-4.32) 
-0.30*** 
(-9.71) 
-0.30*** 
(-9.90) 
-0.32*** 
(-11.85) 
-0.32*** 
(-11.96) 
Business models          
Income  
Divers. 
0.003*** 
(5.10) 
0.003*** 
(5.17) 
0.003*** 
(4.80) 
0.003*** 
(4.73) 
0.003*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(4.78) 
0.003*** 
(4.83) 
0.003*** 
(4.79) 
0.003*** 
(4.80) 
Size -0.16*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.17*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.17*** 
(4.17) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.49) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004*** 
(5.27) 
0.004*** 
(5.30) 
0.004*** 
(4.98) 
0.004** 
(5.05) 
0.004*** 
(5.81) 
0.004*** 
(5.84) 
0.004*** 
(5.25) 
0.004** 
(5.26) 
0.004*** 
(5.06) 
0.004*** 
(5.07) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.09*** 
(-4.09) 
-1.02*** 
(-4.10) 
-1.16*** 
(-4.56) 
-1.13*** 
(-4.38) 
-1.02*** 
(-3.90) 
-1.03*** 
(-3.91) 
-1.05*** 
(-3.87) 
-1.06*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.34) 
Term  
spread 
0.033*** 
(4.86) 
0.033*** 
(4.82) 
0.033*** 
(4.62) 
0.033*** 
(4.58) 
0.034*** 
(4.83) 
0.034*** 
(4.82) 
0.031*** 
(4.74) 
0.031*** 
(4.69) 
0.031*** 
(4.21) 
0.031*** 
(4.19) 
Constant 4.523*** 
(5.76) 
4.488*** 
(5.75) 
4.873*** 
(6.68) 
4.801*** 
(6.62) 
4.385*** 
(6.00) 
4.37*** 
(6.01) 
4.48*** 
(5.97) 
4.47*** 
(6.00) 
4.217*** 
(5.52) 
4.18*** 
(5.47) 
Observations 841 841 854 854 847 847 841 841 791 791 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.868 0.868 0.876 0.876 0.871 0.871 0.873 0.874 0.877 0.88 
Hausman  
(p-value) 
0.179 0.111 0.143 0.126 0.130 0.113 0.04 0.039 0.07 0.05 
BP LM Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mod. Wald  
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table shows the RE estimation results of equation (3) with capital and liquidity interactions. See Tables 2-3 for the 
definition of the explanatory variables. Cap*NSFR 10 and Cap*NSFR 14 are the product of the capital formulation and 
the dummy variables NSFR 10 < 1 and NSFR 14 < 1 respectively. Hausman is a test to decide between fixed or random 
effects, the null is that the preferred model is random effects. BP LM Test is the Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
for random effects. Modified Wald is a test of homoscedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets.  
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Table 9 
Replacing LLP to TA with LLR to NPL in the capital equation 
PANEL A       
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to Total 
assets 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)   
Capital Equation      
       
NSFR_14 0.019*** 
(3.11) 
 0.021** 
(2.55) 
   
NSFR_10  0.019*** 
(2.89) 
 0.022** 
(2.60) 
  
       
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y   
      
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital 3.127*** 
(3.39) 
2.917*** 
(3.23) 
2.121*** 
(4.79) 
2.076** 
(4.84) 
  
       
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y   
Hansen  0.044 0.043 0.176 0.214   
Hansen p-value 0.837 0.835 0.674 0.644   
Observations 510 510 839 839   
       
PANEL B       
 CET 1 CET 1 Total Capital Total Capital Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital Equation      
      
NSFR_14 0.065*** 
(4.28) 
 0.034*** 
(3.03) 
 -0.090*** 
(-3.18) 
 
NSFR_10  0.064*** 
(4.23) 
 0.034** 
(3.13) 
 -0.088*** 
(-3.08) 
       
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital 0.333 
(1.57) 
0.315 
(1.53) 
0.831*** 
(3.48) 
0.829*** 
(3.54) 
0.102* 
(1.74) 
0.107* 
(1.76) 
       
Control 
variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Hansen  1.306 1.221 1.439 1.329 0.491 0.512 
Hansen p-value 0.253 0.269 0.230 0.249 0.483 0.475 
Observations 733 733 794 794 783 783 
This table shows the results of estimating system (2) using GMM with an alternative measure of credit risk in the capital 
equation. See table (2) for the definition of the explanatory variables. Bank-level covariates enter the estimations with a 
one quarter lag. Endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged values. The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions for the estimates. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the 
over-identifying restrictions are valid. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
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Table 10 
Replacing the NSFR with alternative liquidity proxies 
PANEL A       
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to Total 
assets 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)   
Capital Equation      
       
cat-fat -0.015* 
(1.75) 
 -0.028* 
(-1.79) 
   
LT GAP  -0.013* 
(1.80) 
 -0.05*** 
(-4.54) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES   
      
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital -0.69** 
(-2.01) 
-1.17** 
(-2.71) 
-0.959* 
(3.62) 
-0.43 
(-1.11) 
  
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y   
       
Hansen  0.851 0.176 3.447 1.957   
Hansen p-value 0.770 0.675 0.178 0.376   
Observations 510 510 839 839   
PANEL B       
 CET 1 CET 1 Total Capital Total Capital Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital Equation      
       
cat-fat -0.064** 
(-2.91) 
 -0.017 
(-1.01) 
 0.572* 
(1.55) 
 
LT GAP  -0.021** 
(1.87) 
 -0.026*** 
(-2.96) 
 0.117*** 
(4.69) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital -0.93 
(-1.26) 
-0.01 
(-1.09) 
0.856** 
(2.29) 
-0.897*** 
(-4.63) 
0.407*** 
(8.73) 
0.109*** 
(2.26) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Hansen  0.876 0.963 0.877 1.016 0.304 0.358 
Hansen p-value 0.349 0.326 0.349 0.313 0.581 0.549 
Observations 800 800 883 883 544 554 
This table shows the results of estimating system (2) using GMM two alternative measures of liquidity risk in both 
equations. cat-fat is the “cat-fat” measure of liquidity creation defined in Berger et al. (2009). The LT GAP is the “liquidity 
transformation gap” (LT gap) of Deep and Schaefer (2004). The LT gap is the difference between liquid liabilities and 
liquid assets held by a bank divided by its total assets. See Tables 2 and 4 for the definition of the explanatory variables. 
Bank-level covariates enter the estimations with a one quarter lag. Endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged 
values. In the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the estimates the null hypothesis is that the instruments used 
are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
 
39 
 
Table 11 
Considering income diversification in the liquidity equation 
PANEL A       
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to Total 
assets 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)   
Capital Equation      
       
NSFR_14 0.025*** 
(3.29) 
 0.020* 
(1.84) 
   
NSFR_10  0.025*** 
(3.25) 
 0.020* 
(2.11) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES   
       
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital 2.906*** 
(2.87) 
2.854*** 
(2.82) 
1.798** 
(4.13) 
1.776** 
(4.19) 
  
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y   
       
Hansen  1.027 1.023 3.436 3.436   
Hansen p-value 0.311 0.312 0.179 0.179   
Observations 552 552 790 790   
PANEL B       
 CET 1 CET 1 Total 
Capital 
Total 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital Equation      
       
NSFR_14 0.052*** 
(3.339) 
 0.022** 
(2.15) 
 -0.026* 
(-1.71) 
 
NSFR_10  0.056*** 
(3.54) 
 0.023** 
(2.19) 
 -0.027* 
(-1.73) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital 0.136 
(1.07) 
0.144 
(1.12) 
0.309 
(1.27) 
0.317 
(1.33) 
1.549*** 
(2.75) 
1.544*** 
(2.83) 
Control 
Variables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Hansen  1.171 1.101 1.268 1.184 1.364 1.184 
Hansen p-value 0.279 0.294 0.260 0.276 0.505 0.553 
Observations 760 760 848 848 509 509 
This table shows the results of estimating system (2) using GMM and considering income diversification in the liquidity 
equation. Income diversification is the ratio of interest income over total income. See Tables 2 and 4 for the definition of 
the explanatory variables. Bank-level covariates enter the estimations with a one quarter lag. Endogenous variables are 
instrumented with their lagged values. In the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the estimates the null 
hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are shown in brackets. 
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Table 12 
Liquidity risk management during the crisis 
 NSFR_10 NSFR_14 
   
NPL/TLt-1 -0.431** 
(-2.63) 
-0.443** 
(-2.67) 
∆Loans 0.194** 
(2.70) 
0.195** 
(2.66) 
∆Loans*Interbank spread 32.078* 
(1.76) 
32.317** 
(1.76) 
Deposit/Total Fundingt-1 0.149 
(1.05) 
0.190 
(1.32) 
Deposit/Total Fundingt-1*Interbank spread 17.834 
(1.66) 
18.550 
(1.69) 
Basel III leveraget-1  0.593 
(0.45) 
0.575 
(0.72) 
Basel III leveraget-1*Interbank spread -27.548** 
(-2.57) 
-27.832** 
(-2.57) 
Sizet-1 -0.033 
(-0.26) 
-0.032 
(-0.26) 
Size*Interbank spreadt-1 -5.757** 
(-2.21) 
-5.751** 
(-2.19) 
   
Observations 954 954 
Quarterly Dummies Y Y 
Bank fixed effects Y Y 
R2 adjusted 0.173 0.183 
This table test the liquidity management assumptions during the crisis. The dependent variables are NSFR 2010 and NSFR 
2014, respectively. NPL/TLt-1 is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans of the previous quarter. We use this 
variable to examine the connections between funding liquidity risk and credit risk of the loan portfolio. We include the 
variation of loans over total loans, the ratio of deposits over total funding, the Basel III leverage ratio and the logarithm of 
total assets (size). All the mentioned variables are interacted with the interbank spread as defined in table (2) to take in 
consideration the effect of the crisis. We control for bank fixed effects and time fixed effects using quarterly dummies. *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard 
errors are shown in brackets. 
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Table 13 
IV-RE Baseline model 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
0.684 
(0.50) 
0.690 
(0.50) 
        
           
Equity to 
Total Assets 
  -0.549 
(-0.36) 
-0.560 
(-0.37) 
      
           
CET1     -1.358** 
(-2.05) 
-1.364** 
(-2.07) 
    
Total  
capital 
      -1.482*** 
(-3.01) 
-1.489*** 
(-3.03) 
  
           
Market  
capital 
        -0.653** 
(-2.13) 
-0.654** 
(-2.14) 
Liquidity          
NSFR_10 -0.129 
(-1.23) 
 -0.104 
(-1.05) 
 -0.108 
(-0.87) 
 -0.106 
(-1.11) 
 -0.155 
(-1.12) 
 
NSFR_14  -0.127 
(-1.23) 
 -0.096 
(-0.99) 
 -0.103 
(-0.85) 
 -0.102 
(-1.09) 
 -0.146 
(-1.09) 
Asset quality          
NPL/TL 1.08*** 
(4.76) 
1.08*** 
(4.75) 
1.10*** 
(4.75) 
1.10*** 
(4.75) 
1.02*** 
(4.10) 
1.024*** 
(4.18) 
1.0*** 
(4.01) 
1.01*** 
(4.00) 
0.978*** 
(3.84) 
0.978*** 
(3.83) 
Performance          
ROA 0.894 
(0.58) 
0.889 
(0.57) 
1.079 
(1.09) 
1.789 
(1.09) 
1.34 
(1.32) 
1.33 
(1.30) 
1.42 
(1.17) 
1.41 
(1.16) 
-2.34** 
(-2.44) 
-2.33** 
(-2.41) 
Business models          
Income  
Divers. 
0.003*** 
(5.25) 
0.003*** 
(5.25) 
0.003*** 
(4.82) 
0.003*** 
(4.83) 
0.003*** 
(4.76) 
0.003*** 
(4.77) 
0.003*** 
(4.91) 
0.003*** 
(4.91) 
0.003*** 
(4.97) 
0.003*** 
(4.97) 
Size -0.158*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.158*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.121** 
(-1.99) 
-0.121** 
(-1.99) 
-0.139*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.139*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.161*** 
(-2.91) 
-0.161*** 
(-2.91) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.003*** 
(4.49) 
0.003*** 
(4.48) 
0.003*** 
(4.70) 
0.003*** 
(4.71) 
0.003*** 
(4.76) 
0.003*** 
(4.43) 
0.003*** 
(4.26) 
0.003*** 
(4.26) 
0.003*** 
(4.33) 
0.003*** 
(4.33) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.320*** 
(-5.25) 
-1.321*** 
(-5.25) 
-1.313*** 
(-5.33) 
-1.313*** 
(-5.33) 
-1.34*** 
(-5.00) 
-1.343*** 
(-5.00) 
-1.304*** 
(-4.88) 
-1.304*** 
(-4.88) 
-1.134*** 
(-4.45) 
-1.134*** 
(-4.45) 
Term  
spread 
0.033*** 
(5.81) 
0.033*** 
(5.81) 
0.033*** 
(5.38) 
0.033*** 
(5.39) 
0.033*** 
(5.38) 
0.034*** 
(5.38) 
0.032*** 
(6.24) 
0.032*** 
(6.25) 
0.034*** 
(5.21) 
0.034*** 
(5.22) 
Constant 5.288*** 
(6.95) 
5.29*** 
(6.94) 
5.32*** 
(7.35) 
5.32*** 
(7.35) 
5.219*** 
(6.46) 
5.219*** 
(6.47) 
5.312*** 
(7.16) 
5.313*** 
(7.16) 
4.926*** 
(6.74) 
4.92*** 
(6.73) 
Observations 841 841 854 854 847 847 841 841 791 791 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.867 0.87 0.868 0.868 0.864 0.864 0.874 0.876 0.871 0.871 
This table shows the estimations IV-RE of equation (3). See Tables 2-3 for the definition of the explanatory variables. z-
statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
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Table 14 
IV-RE Model with threshold effects 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital           
Basel III 
leverage 
0.460 
(0.29) 
0.553 
(0.35) 
        
           
Equity to 
Total Assets 
  0.163 
(0.10) 
0.29 
(0.19) 
      
           
CET1     -0.728 
(-1.21) 
-0.724 
(-1.22) 
    
Total 
capital 
      -1.30*** 
(-2.57) 
-1.28*** 
(-2.63) 
  
           
Market 
capital 
        -0.495*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.487*** 
(-2.58) 
Liquidity          
NSFR_10 
<1 
0.057 
(1.23) 
 0.049 
(1.15) 
 0.051 
(1.12) 
 0.02 
(0.61) 
 0.047 
(0.88) 
 
NSFR_14 
<1 
 0.787** 
(1.96) 
 0.069* 
(1.72) 
 0.072* 
(1.70) 
 0.056* 
(1.67) 
 0.054* 
(1.78) 
Asset quality          
NPL/TL 1.05*** 
(4.00) 
1.03*** 
(3.97) 
1.07*** 
(3.99) 
1.07*** 
(3.97) 
0.975*** 
(3.32) 
0.976*** 
(3.35) 
0.913*** 
(3.13) 
0.916*** 
(3.18) 
1.014*** 
(3.37) 
1.01*** 
(3.36) 
Performance          
Roa 0.280 
(0.30) 
0.379 
(0.41) 
0.440 
(0.46) 
0.49 
(0.53) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
0.064 
(0.60) 
0.788 
(0.71) 
0.956 
(0.88) 
1.07 
(1.15) 
1.04 
(1.13) 
Business models          
Income 
Divers. 
0.003*** 
(5.73) 
0.003*** 
(6.03) 
0.003*** 
(5.06) 
0.003*** 
(5.26) 
0.003*** 
(4.61) 
0.003*** 
(4.74) 
0.003*** 
(4.73) 
0.003*** 
(4.84) 
0.003*** 
(4.92) 
0.003*** 
(4.75) 
Size -0.215*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.213*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.217*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.213*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.199*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.197*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.197*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.195*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.229*** 
(-4.33) 
-0.229*** 
(-4.27) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity 
volatility 
0.003*** 
(3.23) 
0.003*** 
(3.23) 
0.003*** 
(3.25) 
0.003** 
(3.26) 
0.003*** 
(3.56) 
0.003*** 
(3.54) 
0.003*** 
(3.42) 
0.003** 
(3.37) 
0.003*** 
(3.23) 
0.003*** 
(3.30) 
Euro 
Stoxx 
-1.441*** 
(-4.39) 
-1.441*** 
(-4.39) 
-1.45*** 
(-4.48) 
-1.46*** 
(-4.49) 
-1.414*** 
(-4.30) 
-1.427*** 
(-4.31) 
-1.410*** 
(-4.37) 
-1.43*** 
(-4.39) 
-1.298*** 
(-3.96) 
-1.29*** 
(-3.97) 
Term 
spread 
0.034*** 
(4.97) 
0.034*** 
(4.95) 
0.033*** 
(4.80) 
0.033*** 
(4.72) 
0.034*** 
(5.36) 
0.034*** 
(5.23) 
0.033*** 
(5.89) 
0.033*** 
(5.72) 
0.034*** 
(4.53) 
0.034*** 
(4.50) 
Constant 5.863*** 
(6.40) 
5.864*** 
(6.36) 
5.932*** 
(6.54) 
5.924*** 
(6.48) 
5.778*** 
(6.55) 
5.789*** 
(6.51) 
5.878*** 
(7.04) 
5.89*** 
(7.01) 
5.690*** 
(6.32) 
5.68*** 
(6.30) 
Observations 841 841 854 854 847 847 841 841 791 791 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.869 0.87 0. 867 0.867 0.867 0.871 0.875 0.876 0.88 0.88 
This table shows the estimations of IV-RE of equation (3) with threshold effects. See Tables 2-3 for the definition of the 
explanatory variables. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics 
based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
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Table 15 
RE model with AR(1) disturbance 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
0.647 
(0.12) 
0.681 
(0.12) 
        
           
Equity to 
Total Assets 
  -0.788*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.786*** 
(-2.75) 
      
           
CET1     -0.138 
(-1.44) 
-0.138 
(-1.43) 
    
Total  
capital 
      -1.44*** 
(-4.94) 
-1.44** 
(-4.93) 
  
           
Market  
capital 
        -0.633*** 
(-5.04) 
-0.63*** 
(-5.04) 
Liquidity           
NSFR_10 0.050 
(1.02) 
 0.060 
(1.30) 
 0.052 
(1.07) 
 0.058 
(1.20) 
 0.042 
(0.90) 
 
NSFR_14  0.051 
(1.05) 
 0.059 
(1.31) 
 0.051 
(1.09) 
 0.057 
(1.21) 
 0.043 
(0.93) 
Asset quality          
NPL/TL 0.431*** 
(3.63) 
0.431*** 
(3.64) 
0.615*** 
(4.59) 
0.615*** 
(4.59) 
0.428*** 
(3.69) 
0.429*** 
(3.70) 
0.394*** 
(3.32) 
0.394*** 
(3.32) 
0.324*** 
(2.83) 
0.326*** 
(2.84) 
Performance          
ROA -0.254* 
(-1.76) 
-0.254*** 
(-1.76) 
-0.232*** 
(-2.20) 
-0.233*** 
(-2.20) 
-0.358*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.358*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.269*** 
(-2.56) 
-0.269*** 
(-2.56) 
-0.303*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.93) 
Business models          
Income  
Divers. 
0.003*** 
(3.17) 
0.003*** 
(3.17) 
0.003*** 
(3.20) 
0.003*** 
(3.20) 
0.003*** 
(3.15) 
0.003*** 
(3.15) 
0.003*** 
(2.97) 
0.003*** 
(2.97) 
0.003*** 
(3.06) 
0.003*** 
(3.06) 
Size -0.183*** 
(-6.29) 
-0.183*** 
(-6.29) 
-0.191*** 
(-7.59) 
-0.190*** 
(-7.58) 
-0.179** 
(-6.70) 
-0.179*** 
(-6.69) 
-0.151*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.154*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.197*** 
(-7.35) 
-0.19*** 
(-7.34) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.003*** 
(8.60) 
0.003*** 
(8.61) 
0.003*** 
(8.33) 
0.003** 
(8.34) 
0.003*** 
(8.78) 
0.003*** 
(8.78) 
0.003*** 
(8.59) 
0.003** 
(8.59) 
0.004*** 
(8.19) 
0.003*** 
(8.20) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.353*** 
(-7.43) 
-1.352*** 
(-7.42) 
-1.342*** 
(-7.43) 
-1.34*** 
(-7.43) 
-1.27*** 
(-6.95) 
-1.27*** 
(-6.94) 
-1.29*** 
(-7.21) 
-1.295*** 
(-7.20) 
-1.16*** 
(-6.23) 
-1.16 *** 
(-6.23) 
Term  
spread 
0.032*** 
(8.63) 
0.033*** 
(8.63) 
0.032*** 
(8.71) 
0.033*** 
(8.71) 
0.032*** 
(8.71) 
0.032*** 
(8.72) 
0.031*** 
(8.44) 
0.031*** 
(8.44) 
0.031*** 
(8.24) 
0.031*** 
(8.24) 
Constant 5.297*** 
(10.69) 
5.293*** 
(10.68) 
5.342*** 
(11.03) 
5.338**** 
(11.02) 
5.096*** 
(10.33) 
5.093*** 
(10.32) 
5.146*** 
(10.62) 
5.143*** 
(10.61) 
4.978*** 
(10.01) 
4.975*** 
(10.00) 
Observations 841 841 854 854 847 847 841 841 791 791 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.865 0.865 0.870 0.870 0.866 0.866 0.870 0.870 0.869 0.869 
This table shows the estimation of RE with AR (1) disturbances of equation (3). See Tables 2-3 for the definition of the 
explanatory variables. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Z-statistics 
based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
 
